John Carl Putvin v. Karen Larie Thompson, Joseph Blaine Thompson : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
John Carl Putvin v. Karen Larie Thompson, Joseph
Blaine Thompson : Petition for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Daniel Darger. Attorney for Appellee.
Mitchell R. Barker. Attorney for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Putvin v. Thompson, No. 930359 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5267
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BH:EF 
,KET NO. 120251 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN 
Plaintiff and Appellee 
vs. 
Case No: 930359-CA 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON 
JOSEPH BLAINE THOMPSON 
Defendant and Appellant 
Priority No: 4 
P E T I T I O N F O R R E H E A R I N G 
ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Mitchell R. Barker 
349 South 200 East #170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellee 
Daniel Darger 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt LataTcity, Ut 84111 
Telephone 801-531-6686 
Attorney for Appellant 
FILED 
JUN 22 894 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN 
Plaintiff and Appellee 
vs. 
: Case No: 930359-CA 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON : 
JOSEPH BLAINE THOMPSON 
: Priority No: 4 
Defendant and Appellant 
P E T I T I O N F O R R E H E A R I N G 
ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Mitchell R. Barker Daniel Darger 
349 South 200 East #170 1000 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake^City, Ut 84111 
Attorney for Appellee Telephone 801-531-6686 
Attorney for Appellant 
COMES NOW Appellant herein, pursuant to Rule 35, U.R.A.P. and hereby petitions 
this court for rehearing of the above matter. This petition is based upon the grounds that this 
court has overlooked or misapprehended fact and law as follows: 
I. APPELLANT'S RULE 59 MOTION WAS TIMELY AND THIS COURTS 
RULING OTHERWISE IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
This Court ruled at page 5 that "[t]he Rule 59 motion would be untimely because 
Thompson filed it more than ten days after the trial court denied the prior Rule 60 motion." 
(emphasis added) This court misapprehends the law. Rule 59 only requires that a motion 
under that rule be served within 10 days. There is no requirement that it be filed within that 
time to be timely. 
Instead, Rule 5(d) U.R.C.P provides: 
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed 
with the court either before service or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
And the case of Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) is directly on point on the issue of 
whether Rule 5(d) applies to a motion brought under Rule 59. This case held that it does and 
further held that a reasonable time for filing a Rule 59 motion after service was two days. 
In the instant case, it is uncontroverted that Appellee was served with Appellant's Rule 
59 motion within the ten day time period. The motion was filed with the trial court two days 
later, on March 24, 1993. Consistent with the above law, Appellant's Rule 59 motion was 
timely filed and this court's ruling otherwise is in error. 
II. THE EVIDENCE WAS NEWLY DISCOVERED AND NOT MERELY 
CUMULATIVE. 
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This court appears to rule that the evidence was not "newly discovered" as 
follows; 
a. The Rule 59 motion was untimely and we will treat it as a rule 60(b) motion. 
b. Darger discovered the evidence on November 18, 1992 and the trial court did 
not deny the original 60(b) motion until "spme four months after Darger discovered the 'new' 
evidence..." and denied the Rule 59 motion six ^ months after discovery. 
c. "Thus, the "newly discovered" evidence was discovered or discoverable in 
ample time to move for relief under Rule 59(b) in the first instance; therefore, it does not 
meet the requirements of Rule 60(b)(2). 
This conclusion is certainly correct. For the evidence was not discovered within the 
six month period within which it could be brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2). And, as the 
Court notes: "[e]ven the date Kimball executed his affidavit was within the ten-day period for 
a Rule 59 filing." 
However, the above analysis is faulty because it is based upon a false premises, ie. that the 
filing of the Rule 59 motion was untimely. Instead, as noted above, the Rule 59 motion was 
brought timely under Utah law. 
Further, the uncontroverted affidavit of Mr. Darger indicates that he did inquire of Mr. 
Kimball as to the circumstances surrounding the entry of the default decree shortly after 
entering an appearance in May, 1992 and was unable to discover the admissions later made 
by Mr. Kimball. In November, 1992, Mr. Kimball merely indicated that he would be willing 
to sign a statement as to the facts surrounding the entry of the default decree. It was not until 
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December 9, 1992 that Darger actually discovered the facts and admissions that Mr. Kimball 
was willing to provide. 
And this evidence was brought to the trial court's attention at the earliest opportunity 
pursuant to the Rule 59 motion. It must be remembered that although the trial court had 
entered a ruling denying the Rule 60(b) motion on November 18, 1992, it did not enter an 
order reflecting this decision until March 11, 1993. 
Thus, when Darger discovered the admissions (whether on November 18th or 
December 9th), it was well beyond the 3 month period from entry of the default decree and 
could not have been brought to the trial court's attention pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) even if the 
trial court had not ruled on that motion already. Counsel had no other readily available 
procedural method for bringing this evidence before the trial court but to wait for the order 
denying the Rule 60(b) motion to be entered and then file a timely Rule 59 motion. This is 
exactly what happened. 
Further, it must be remembered that Darger is in no position to make the trial judge 
enter the order denying the 60(b) motion any sooner than he did. Once the admissions were 
discovered, they were brought to the judges attention as soon as the rules of procedure 
allowed. 
Thus, this Court is not correct in noting at Opinion, page 6, that M[t]he 'newly 
discovered evidence' could have been raised pursuant to either Rule 59 or Rule 60. For while 
these two rules are the primary procedures for bringing such evidence to the court's attention, 
Rule 60 was no longer available because the three month limitation in which to do so had 
long since passed. 
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This court also rules that the evidence is not "newly discovered" but cumulative 
because it merely provides a retrospective analysis of the November 4th letter. The court 
misapprehends the facts. For Appellant has claimed on appeal that even if Kimball were 
found not to have been discharged by that letter but continued as Appellant's attorney, he 
nevertheless, executed the findings and decree prejudicing her substantive rights without her 
authority and contrary to her express direction. 
Regardless of the content of the November 4th letter, Mr. Kimball's sworn admission 
that he had no authority to compromise his client's claim goes far beyond any analysis of the 
letter. His admissions are evidence that goes to the very heart of our justice system and 
needed to be brought to the attention of the trial judge. The Court's ruling that these 
admissions are not "newly discovered" but merely cumulative is in error. 
IH. THIS COURT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE RELIEF PURSUANT TO 
APPELLANTS' APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF HER RULE 60(b) MOTION 
CONTRARY TO LAW AS SET OUT IN THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff moved to alter or amend on two separate grounds. First, was that the denial 
of the motion was contrary to law as set forth in the 60(b) motion [Rule 59(6) & (7)]. This 
argument inserted the original issues of 60(b) motion into the Rule 59 motion. The second 
ground was the "newly discovered" evidence [Rule 59(4)]. Appeal was taken from denial of 
the Rule 59 motion on both grounds and constituted an appeal of the denial of the 60(b) 
motion and all issues raised therein. Yet this Court has failed to rule on any of the issues 
raised in the 60(b) motion and briefed extensively on appeal 
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Failure to even consider the issues Appellant has timely raised on appeal is contrary to 
the rights guaranteed by Article I, § 11 & 24 of the Utah Constitution. Section 11 provides 
that "...every person ... shall have a remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay..." While case law indicates that this section places 
limitations upon the legislature to prevent it from closing the doors of the courts [eg. Berry ex 
rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670,675 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
has also held "that a clear implication of this language is 'that an individual [may] not be 
arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights.' ". 
Comdemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 357 (Utah 1989), citing Berry, supra. 
Appellant asserts that Section 11, taken together with the due process protection 
contained in Section 24, operate as a limitation on the courts ability to deny remedies 
designed to protect basic individual rights. [Condemarin v. University Hosp., supra; In re 
Thomas, 190 P. 952 (Utah 1920)] This Court's failure to rule upon properly perfected issues 
on appeal, one way or the other, constitutes such a denial contrary to the above provisions of 
the Utah Constitution. 
This Court's failure to rule on the issues raised in Appellant's appeal is also contrary 
to Rule 3, U.R.A.P. which allows an appeal as*a matter of right from final orders and 
judgments of a district court. The trial court's denial of Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion was 
such a final order [Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettlet\ 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1979)] And Rule 
4(b) U.R.A.P. required Appellant to wait until her Rule 59 motion was ruled upon before 
filing appeal of the denial of her 60(b) motion. 
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Thus, Appellant has a right to have this Court rule on the issues perfected for appeal 
on the merits. This Court's failure to do so is contrary to the above rules and, therefore, 
contrary to law. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court vacate its opinion affirming the trial 
court and consider her appeal on the merits. 
DATED this S%2~. day of f 1/lMsU 1994. 
DANIEL DARGER 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for 
Rehearing has been hand delivered to Mitchell R. Barker, 349 South 200 East, Suite 170, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84111, this Qp day of ^\OLtU , 1994. 
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